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JAMES L. WOOD, *Necessity and Contingency in the Philosophy of Parmenides*

Parmenides' poem presents a riddle in its simultaneous rejection of the way of nonbeing and of the "mortal" way of seeking truth in contingent being and its subsequent account of contingent being in the so-called Way of Opinion. This paper argues that we can best interpret the status of the Way of Opinion (and of the Proem), and of the beings that they recount, by accepting the reality of contingent being and seeing a link between necessary and contingent being, a link that is itself necessary because it lies at the heart of what it means to be. We can make the best sense of Parmenides' poem as a whole by seeing the cosmos of contingent beings as the self-manifestation of necessary being, and the misunderstanding of "mortals" not in their acceptance of the reality of contingent beings but in their failure to grasp the distinction and the connection between the modes of being.

CHARLES E. SNYDER, *Arcesilaus and the Ontology of Stoic Cognition*

The focus of this paper is the dispute between the Academic Arcesilaus of Pitane (ca. 316–214 BC) and the early Stoic philosophy of Zeno of Citium. Scholars typically claim that Arcesilaus set out to attack Zeno's epistemology, or theory of knowledge. The framework of epistemology prevails in the modern reconstruction of Arcesilaus's arguments. Proponents of this framework usually contend that the epistemic possibility of Stoic *κατάληψις* is the principal aim of Arcesilaus's attack. The aim of this article is to contest the limited scope of the framework of epistemology in the interpretation of Arcesilaus's attack, and reposition his critical arguments, in view of the fragmentary evidence, within the framework of an ontology of knowledge. The paper reconstructs Academic indiscernibility arguments against the early Stoa to show that the attack on the epistemic possibility of *κατάληψις* sets out to undermine the ontological conditions of Stoic *κατάληψις*.

PAUL SYMINGTON, *Powerful Logic: Prime Matter as Principle of Individuation and Pure Potency*

A lean hylomorphism stands as a metaphysical holy grail. An embarrassing feature of traditional hylomorphic ontologies is prime matter. Prime matter is so basic that it cannot be examined (in principle), and its engagement with the other hylomorphic elements is far from clear. One particular problem posed by prime matter is how it is to be understood both as a principle of individuation for material substances and as pure potency. The author presents Thomas Aquinas's way of squeezing some intelligibility out of prime matter by modeling it on the idea of logical genus. Such a modeling provides insight into understanding prime matter as substratum, as maximally indeterminate, and as ontologically vague. One of the unusual but exciting things that fall out from this analysis of prime matter is the entirety thesis: "For any substance *x*, if *x* has prime matter then the

prime matter of x is the same* as x ,” where ‘same*’ is understood as “indeterminately identical.”

BENJAMIN BERGER, Schelling, Hegel, and the History of Nature

This paper argues that one of the key differences between Schelling and Hegel concerns the potential within their respective systems to conceive the history of nature as philosophically significant. The author begins by considering the late Schelling’s critique of Hegel in order to elucidate the difference between an ontology of nature and a philosophical history of nature. With this distinction in mind, he turns to the early Schelling’s philosophy of nature and argue that, despite his insistence on the atemporal character of nature’s system of stages, the early Schelling nevertheless hints at the ontological significance of nature’s history. He goes on to interpret Hegel’s rejection of the idea that natural history might be of significance to an ontology of nature, and argues that this view must be understood in light of Hegel’s conception of nature as “self-external reason.” He concludes by suggesting that it is only in Schelling’s middle period—and, in particular, in the Ages of the World—that the rationally necessary development from inorganic nature to life and spirit is presented as a historical development, making this period of Schelling’s thought the high point of idealist philosophy of nature.

MICHAEL B. BURKE, Liberated Presentism

The article gives a novel argument to show that there is sense of "exists" suitable for posing a substantive issue between presentists and eternalists. It then seeks to invigorate a neglected variety of presentism. There are seven doctrines, widely accepted even among presentists, that create problems for presentism. The doctrines are that only existents can belong to sets, be referred to, be quantified over, have properties, bear relations, be constituents of propositions, and serve as truth-makers. Without distinguishing existence and being, presentists can comfortably reject all seven doctrines. Doing so would dispose of the majority of presentism’s problems. Further, it would enable presentists to reduce A-judgments to B-judgments, thereby insulating presentism from doubts about the intelligibility of A-theories. For reasons indicated very briefly, it might also make presentism less difficult to reconcile with special relativity, though the point is not pursued here.