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GUY SCHUH, Friendship and Aristotle's Defense of Psychological Eudaimonism

Aristotle holds that the ultimate goal of our action is our own happiness ("psychological eudaimonism"). Though this position is controversial, it is widely thought that he never attempts to defend it. The author argues, to the contrary, that he does. He begins by pointing out that in *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.8 Aristotle raises an endoxic challenge to psychological eudaimonism—namely, that virtuous people act selflessly, especially in relation to their friends—and that he responds to this challenge by declaring that the (observable) "facts" disagree with these popular "speeches." The author then argues that some of the facts that Aristotle has in mind can be found in his surrounding discussion of friendship. Specifically, the author points to two observations in the *Nicomachean* account of friendship that suggest that friendship isn't a source of selfless motivation for virtuous people—that friendship dissolves with distance and that friends do not wish their friends to become gods—and one observation that suggests that virtuous friends do not benefit each other selflessly tout court—that friendship requires an equal return of benefit in order to preserve itself.

DAVID SVOBODA and PROKOP SOUSEDIK, Thomas Aquinas and Some Thomists on the Nature of Mathematics

The authors explicate Aquinas's conception of mathematics. They show that in his work the Aristotelian conception is prevalent, according to which this discipline is—together with physics and metaphysics—a theoretical science, whose subject is the study of real quantity and its necessary properties. But, alongside this dominant and prevalent conception, Aquinas's work contains a number of indications that cast doubt. These sparse and rather marginal reflections lead the authors to conclude that Aquinas's texts contain a "constructivist" conception of mathematics in rudimentary form. According to this approach, mathematics is not a theoretical science examining real quantity but, rather, a special kind of "art" by means of which mathematical objects are "created." From a constructivist point of view the authors then attempt to formulate a conception of mathematics that would accord with the basic Aristotelian assumptions of Aquinas's thought.

DOMENIC D'ETTORE, Being as First Known and the Analogy or Univocity of Being: Scotus versus Cajetan

From the early fourteenth century onward, it was commonplace for Thomists and Scotists to engage each other's arguments for and against the analogous or univocal character of being as common to God and creatures and across the categories of being. On the Thomist side, Thomas de Vio Cajetan's contribution to this debate stands out for its attentiveness to the relevance of more foundational questions concerning how being is first known—distinctly or confusedly. Drawing from Scotus's *Ordinatio* and Cajetan's *In De Ente et*

*Essentia d. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria* (1495), this paper shows how Cajetan offers both a genuine challenge and an alternative to the conception of being that underlies Scotus's primary argument for the univocity of being (that is, the argument from a certain and doubtful concept).

JENSEN SUTHER, Hegel's Logic of Freedom: Toward a "Logical Constitutivism"

A renewed interest in Hegel's *Logic* has led to important breakthroughs in our understanding of a number of Hegelian topics. Through a new interpretation of Hegel as a "logical constitutivist," This essay seeks to challenge both Robert Pippin's and John McDowell's influential and important accounts of Hegel's notion of freedom. Against Pippin's claim that freedom in Hegel is a social and historical status "achieved" by certain living beings, the author argues that Hegel's logical account of freedom renders rational agency intelligible as a distinct form of life. Following an assessment of the status of the *Logic* as an account of intelligibility itself, the author reads Hegel's logical concept of life as the primitive form of practical spontaneity and interpret his concept of knowing as the rational form of living self-maintenance. Yet in contrast to McDowell's neo-Aristotelian critique of Pippin, he shows that Hegel's key idea of a "free genus" is more than a generic classification of free individuals: it seeks to account for the kind of living beings that collectively legislate their own normative constraints. In deducing the natural kind of specifically free beings (the "free genus"), Hegel achieves his logical ambition of demonstrating what must be true of both thought itself and certain living organisms for anything to be intelligible as what it is.

C. STEPHEN EVANS, Worldviews, Moral Seemings, and Moral Epistemology

This article argues that the debate about moral knowledge is influenced by worldview-type background beliefs. Metaphysical naturalism supports a skeptical view of moral knowledge consistent with noncognitivism. The author argues a reasonable case for moral knowledge can be made, based on a weak form of intuitionism that is empiricist in character. On this account, moral knowledge has its beginnings in "moral seemings," perceptual experiences of moral properties providing varying degrees of epistemic support for moral judgments about particular actions and states of affairs. This account is consistent with accounts of moral knowledge offered by contemporary psychologists. Evolutionary debunking arguments appear to threaten such a view, but they gain much of their apparent force from the background metaphysical assumptions. In conclusion, the author suggests, in the spirit of Kant, that a commitment to moral knowledge may be rooted in a reasonable "moral faith," which holds that we are morally obligated to believe in the reality of moral obligations.