Socrates' Analysis of Comedy in Plato's *Philebus*, DEREK DUPLESSIE

This article considers Socrates' psychological analysis of comedy in Plato's *Philebus*. While Socrates turns to comedy to illustrate the general mixture of pleasures and pains in the soul by itself, it is not initially clear what or whose experience is under analysis. The author argues that the analysis gives two accounts which, though related, are separate: Socrates identifies harmless self-ignorance as the proper object of laughter, and he identifies envy (*pthonos*) as an additional condition of laughter. Comedy thus mixes the pleasure of laughter at one's self-ignorant friends with the pain of *phthonos*. The author makes the case that, although the account's emphasis on *phthonos* is somewhat idiosyncratic, it is at least—if not especially—applicable to the psychology of Aristophanes and his comic portrayal of Socrates. For it is especially in making a laughingstock of one's truly enviable friends that laughter is able to assuage the sting of envy. It is *phthonos* that motivates one to engage in comedy-making rather than simply to laugh. Aristophanes is perhaps neither as just nor as convivial as he presents himself. The account therefore points toward a tragicomic failure of self-knowledge on the part of the comic poet, whose art trades on exposing the self-ignorance of boasters. The article concludes by turning to Socrates' analysis of false opinions and pleasures to indicate the sense in which Plato's, in contrast to Aristophanes', presentation of Socratic philosophy is uniquely invulnerable to comic representation.

Thomas Aquinas on the Virtues of Character and Virtuous Ends, ALEXANDER STÖPFGESHOFF and CHRISTOPHER BOBIER

Thomas Aquinas situates virtues of character in the noncognitive appetite. He also claims that virtues of character provide the ends in practical matters. Since providing proper ends seems to be a cognitive act, it is unclear how virtues of character, qua perfections of the noncognitive appetite, provide ends. After criticizing three approaches to this interpretive challenge, we suggest that Aquinas provides us with a theory of practical identity. We argue that that on Aquinas's view a practical identity is constituted both by a virtuous disposition in the appetitive power and by a rational commitment to proximate ends, a rational commitment that results from acquiring the virtuous disposition. With this account of practical identity in mind, we explain how Aquinas can consistently claim that virtues, qua perfections of the appetite, provide ends.

Suárez's Metaphysics of Active Powers, JACOB TUTTLE

In the last several years, there has been an uptick of scholarly interest in Aristotelian theories of efficient causation. Much of this interest has focused on the late scholastic figure Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). This article clarifies an important but neglected aspect of Suárez's theory of efficient causation—namely, his account of active causal powers. Like other Aristotelians, Suárez understands active causal powers as features that enable their subjects to perform certain sorts of actions. For example, a fire is able to heat in virtue of its power or capacity for heating. However, it is not immediately clear which items in an Aristotelian ontology perform the role of an active power. This article explains and motivates Suárez's answer to this question and shows

how this answer influences his position in a scholastic controversy about the causal roles of substantial and accidental forms in substantial change.

On the Incompatibility of Hegel's *Phenomenology* with the Beginning of his *Logic* ROBB DUNPHY

The author argues that the beginning of Hegel's *Logic* does indeed depend for its justification upon the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, but that Hegel's attempt to secure the beginning of his *Logic* in this fashion fails. He gives an account of the beginning of Hegel's *Logic*, intended to demonstrate the necessity of the *Phenomenology* to this project. After dispensing with inadequate models of the justificatory relation between the two works, he suggests that the interpretation favored by William Maker makes the best possible sense of the relation between the *Phenomenology* and the beginning of the *Logic*. He provides a number of reasons for thinking that, despite its ingenuity, this attempt to justify Hegel's position at the beginning of the *Logic* fails, thereby possibly threatening the security of Hegel's logical project.

MacIntyre contra MacIntyre: Interpretive Philosophy and Aristotle, JASON BLAKELY

This article critically analyzes the normative theory of Alasdair MacIntyre, who is arguably one of the most influential political philosophers of the last fifty years. Specifically, it rejects the standard view that MacIntyre's later theory represents a single, coherent system. Instead, his mature thought is marked by two conflicting periods. Indeed, MacIntyre's earlier synthesis of Aristotle and interpretive philosophy is seen as in tension with his later turn to biological metaphysics. Interpretive philosophy clarifies how cultural meanings are constitutive of human agency. The legacy of MacIntyre for ethical and political theory is thus mixed—offering both resources and pitfalls.