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Hypokeimenon versus Substance, KEREN WILSON SHATALOV

Scholars of Aristotle's logical works generally agree that in those works the criterion for something being a substance is its being a subject, or ὑποκείμενον. Yet the question of what it is to be a ὑποκείμενον for Aristotle tends to be understudied. Because of this, there is a significant limitation to our understanding of Aristotle's view of substance. The author argues that ὑποκείμενον is not actually presented as the criterion for substancehood in *Categories*, thus calling into question some entrenched views about Aristotelian substance and subjecthood. This compels us to ask anew what being a ὑποκείμενον is meant to tell us about being a substance and brings into sharp relief the fact that in *Categories* Aristotle explains little about his notion of subjecthood. However, *Categories* contains a pointer to a discussion in *Posterior Analytics* in which the notion of ὑποκείμενον becomes clearer.

The Ambiguity in Schopenhauer's Doctrine of the Thing-in-Itself, VASFI O. ÖZEN

The general attitude toward Arthur Schopenhauer's metaphysics is rather fiercely critical and at times even tendentious. The figure of Schopenhauer as an irredeemably flawed, stubborn, and contradictory philosopher serves as a leitmotif among scholars. Schopenhauer's identification of the thing-in-itself with the will continues to be a thorny puzzle in the secondary literature, and it presents perhaps the greatest challenge to Schopenhauer scholars. Schopenhauer borrows the term "thing-in-itself" from Kant, who uses it to refer to a reality that is distinct from what appears to us and hence unknowable. Despite the fact that several interpretations have been offered to make sense of Schopenhauer's identification of the thing-in-itself with the will, there appears to be no consensus about how to interpret this identification as well as his understanding of the term "thing-in-itself." Unlike the other interpretations, the interpretation offered in this article distinguishes three distinct and mutually incompatible views that Schopenhauer formulates about the thing-in-itself. The author argues that it is not only difficult to give a coherent, consistent account of Schopenhauer's position, but also not worth trying, because such an endeavor comes at the cost of ignoring the textual richness and depth of thought that Schopenhauer's works offer.

Heidegger on (In)finitude and the Greco-Latin Grammar of Being, RICHARD J. COLLEDGE

Heideggerian thought is routinely understood to involve an insistence on finitude, and a rejection of the metaphysical priority of the infinite. As a general rule, this characterization is adequate, but it risks a significant oversimplification of a complex theme in Heidegger's thinking. After an initial discussion of Heidegger's dominant position on (in)finitude, the article focuses on a number of largely neglected and/or some recently published texts concerning Heidegger's retrieval of the inheritance of the Greco-Latin grammar of being, as well as the Greek origins of the idea of the infinite in Anaximander's ἄπειρον. These texts reveal some important and telling

tensions and ambiguities in Heideggerian thought on the status of infinitude in its relation to *die Sache selbst* of that thought.

Metaphysics and the Hermeneutical Relevance of Worldviews, RUDOLF MAKKREEL

Starting with Dilthey's analysis of worldview types derived from metaphysics, the author proposes a hermeneutical approach that examines the formation of worldviews in terms of the contextual conditions that shape our experience. Whereas Dilthey focused on the way worldviews integrate the cognitive, evaluative, and volitional dimensions of experience, the author relates these philosophical levels to the historical and sociocultural influences on our lives. Worldviews orient us to the world based on how we assimilate the local commonalities we inherit, how we acquire an intellectual worldly understanding aimed at universal consensus, and finally how we appropriate this reflectively to also generate individual self-understanding. This complexity represents a philosophical challenge to mutual understanding and demands a diagnostic hermeneutics to analyze the hidden tensions that exist within many worldviews and the critical problems they produce when communicating with others who differ in outlook. These issues must be addressed in today's interconnected but multicultural world.

Metaphysics, Political Philosophy, and the Process of Liberal Political Justification, DANIEL A. DOMBROWSKI

This article is an exercise in process liberalism in which the author argues for both the processual character of Rawlsian political liberalism and the politically liberal character of Whiteheadian or Hartshornian process metaphysics. The key question he addresses: How can people live together in a free yet peaceful manner in a condition of pervasive pluralism of religious, moral, and metaphysical comprehensive doctrines? He argues that politically liberal democracies are not metaphysics-poor, as is sometimes alleged, but rather are hypermetaphysical in that the goal is to have as many metaphysical views flourish as are "reasonable" (as this term is defined in political liberalism), and hence as are compatible with justice.