The Priority of the Soul as Actuality in Aristotle’s *De anima*, IGNACIO DE RIBERA-MARTIN

What has heretofore seemed to be a transitional passage in *De anima* 2.2 is key to explicating the causal priority of the soul as actuality of the body. Soul is prior not only to matter and the activities of life but also to its powers and to any other actuality of the body. This substantial, and not just temporal, priority is articulated in the contrast between soul and knowledge in *De anima* 2.2.414a8–14: we live, perceive, and think in virtue of both the soul and the formal qualities of the body, but we do so primarily only in virtue of the soul.

Transumption and the Decentered Cosmology of Nicolaus Cusanus, CARLOS ZORRILLA P.

In his work *On Learned Ignorance*, Cusanus defends the view that though the infinite must as such always elude human cognitive pursuits, proper reflection on the reasons behind that cognitive failure inaugurate another—different but not unrelated—domain of epistemic competence. Seeking to equip the intellect with a methodological access into this new epistemic domain, Cusanus transforms the classical notion of transumption from a merely rhetorical device into an epistemological speculative aid that transits between the different ontological levels that constitute reality. This article examines Cusanus’s use of one such transumptive aid—the rubric of the infamous sphere whose center is everywhere and circumference nowhere—in order to elucidate how it enacts the basic postulates of “learned ignorance.” Insofar as what necessitates the use of such transumptive images, and hence of the epistemic operations which they represent, is the very ontological structure ciphered by the particular way in which the universe stands in relationship to God, the author claims that these transumptive functions constitute a thorough interpenetration of epistemology and metaphysics in Cusanus’s thinking.

Kant and the Principle of Sufficient Reason, HUAPING LU-ADLER

Leibniz, and many following him, saw the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) as pivotal to a scientific (demonstrated) metaphysics. Against this backdrop, Kant is expected to pay close attention to PSR in his reflections on the possibility of metaphysics, which is his chief concern in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is far from clear, however, what has become of PSR in the Critique. On one reading, Kant has simply turned it into the causal principle of the Second Analogy. On a different reading, PSR is but the supreme principle of reason, which roughly states that, if the conditioned is given, so is the unconditioned. On the author’s reading, PSR appears in the guises of both the causal principle and the supreme principle. This twofold specification, she argues, is key to understanding (i) Kant’s allegations that past metaphysicians failed to prove PSR, (ii) his own Critical account of the possibility of metaphysics in both of its parts (ontology and metaphysics proper), and (iii) his nuanced answer to the contentious question about the relation between physical inquiry and metaphysical reasoning about nature (both being quests for reasons).
Self-consciousness Is Desire Itself: On Hegel’s Dictum, NICOLÁS GARCÍA MILLS

In this paper, the author offers a novel reconstruction of Hegel’s argument for his mysterious claim that “self-consciousness is desire itself.” In section 1, he motivates two interpretive constraints, which he refers to as the practicality constraint and the continuity constraint. According to the former, the kind of desire that Hegel argues is a necessary condition of self-consciousness involves a practical (and so not merely theoretical or contemplative) relation between subject and object. According to the latter, Hegel’s argument takes as its sole starting point a shape of consciousness that has itself as object or, as Hegel puts it, a shape that consists in “a distinguishing of what is not distinct.” The author argues that recent influential interpretations openly or tacitly violate either the practicality constraint or the continuity constraint. In section 2, he pieces together his own, alternative interpretation of Hegel’s argument, which heeds the two constraints in a way that fits Hegel’s text more closely than do other interpretations. He thus hopes to shed new light on Hegel’s view that the I or consciousness can have itself as its object only if it also relates to external objects in a desirous, destructive way.

Heidegger on the Unity of Metaphysics and the Method of Being and Time, GILAD NIR

The fundamental error of the metaphysical tradition, according to Heidegger, is the subordination of general ontology to the ontology of a special, exemplary entity (God, the soul, and so on). But Being and Time itself treats one kind of entity as exemplary, namely, Dasein. Does this mean that Heidegger fails to free himself from the kind of metaphysics that he sought to criticize? To show how he avoids this charge the author proposes to examine the parallels between the methodology of Being and Time and the methodology Heidegger ascribes to Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Heidegger takes the virtue of Aristotle’s inquiry to reside in the way he resists the subordination of general to special ontology: Aristotle was guided by a “double concept” of metaphysics, pursued two irreducibly distinct methods of inquiry, and avoided the temptation to unite them. In proposing to similarly pursue a “double task” in Being and Time Heidegger seeks to apply this insight to his own work. Alongside the task of fundamental ontology, Heidegger spells out the shape of a second task, Destruktion, understood as a historical critique that traces ontological concepts back to their ontic roots. But Destruktion is not a mere addendum to fundamental ontology; the two tasks are meant to counterbalance one another and thereby prevent the collapse of the ontological difference between being and beings. Indeed, Heidegger proposes to apply Destruktion to the results of his own fundamental ontology. He hopes to thereby achieve a transformation of the philosophical attitude that underpins the metaphysical tradition.