A Philosophical Account of Learning: What Can Aristotle’s Account of Potency and Act Teach Us? ANGUS BROOK

In recent decades, there has been a revival of interest in Aristotle’s account of potency and act in metaphysics. This includes a growing interest in exploring a powers ontology reading of Aristotle’s account of perception and intellect. What is particularly interesting about this trend in current Aristotelian scholarship is that in explaining how Aristotle’s metaphysical theory of causal powers works, often the research skirts on the edges of discussions of these powers in relation to education. The revival of interest in potency and act, and the corresponding development of a loosely speaking Aristotelian powers ontology, provides fertile intellectual ground for thinking through what this tells us about what Aristotle might have to teach us about learning, or at least new ways of thinking through what we think we know about Aristotle’s philosophy of education. This article is an attempt to make a beginning at answering this question.

The Politics of Religion in Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, JONATHAN H. KRAUSE

Reading the Treatise in view of Hume’s civic interest in religion sheds light on the work, especially book 3, “Of Morals,” where Hume gives an account of the historical genesis of modern political life. Interestingly, his account does not mention the influence of religion. Hume’s silence on this matter leads many commentators to treat religion as a peripheral issue in the Treatise. Others suspect that Hume’s underlying intentions in the Treatise are irreligious and even anti-Christian. The author argues that Hume’s exposition of political life in book 3 indicates his downplaying of any influence religion ought to have in public affairs. For, Hume intends book 3’s genetic account to be both descriptive and prescriptive. His “history” specifies ideas and virtues he thinks benefit society. Religion’s absence from this account reflects Hume’s attempt to sideline from the political arena religious beliefs and practices he considers neither essential nor beneficial to modern life.

Deconstructio More Geometrico: On the Univocity of Being and the Ontological Difference, KASPER LYSEMOSE

The ancient philosophical dispute about the unity and difference of being is clearly recalled—and strangely displaced—in two later emblematic notions: the univocity of being, as the keystone in Spinoza’s thinking, and the ontological difference, as the operative concept in Heidegger’s quest for the meaning of being (Sinn von Sein). In this article the author attempts to render the often evoked complicity between these two thinkers more explicit in terms of these two notions. How is being communicated to the modes? Taking this question from Heidegger as point of departure, an answer is excavated through a reading of Spinoza’s concept of attributes. On that reading, it turns out that the unity and difference of being, as communicated to the modes, is not dialectical but deconstructive. Hence, the order of created beings—constructio more
geometrico—is perceived as such in a beatific thinking that responds—deconstructio more geometrico—to being.

Social Interactions, Aristotelian Powers, and the Ontology of the I-You Relation, JAMES KINTZ

Much of the discussion on the second-person has focused on the character of second-person thought, with many arguing that “you thoughts” are intrinsically reciprocal and thus can be achieved only by two persons together. Yet while the character of second-person thought is important, the ontology of the second-person relation has been largely overlooked, but an ontological analysis of this relation uncovers resources that help advance our understanding of what makes the second-person unique. In this article the author outlines competing positions regarding the character of second-person thought, and then utilizes an Aristotelian powers ontology to raise challenges for the claim that second-person thoughts are intrinsically reciprocal. However, he then employs this ontological framework to highlight the bidirectional and dynamic nature of this relation, which in turn reveals a unique form of personal interdependence within the second-person relation. Thus, independently of the character of second-person thought, this ontological approach supports the position that the second-person interaction necessarily involves reciprocation.

Toward an Ordinal Naturalism, LAWRENCE CAHOONE

Justifying a metaphysics requires talking about things in a language that does not presume the view we defend. The most pluralistic, minimal language available is objective relativism, from the American philosophical tradition. What is discriminated by objective relativism is can then be accounted for by an emergent naturalism. This view accepts the a posteriori, nomological fact that some orders of “complexes” asymmetrically depend on others, that is, those studied by the human sciences on those studied by the natural sciences. Naturalism is thereby defined independently of physicalism or materialism, while still recognizing that the natural sciences enjoy a limited, nonepistemic priority. The physical, material, biological, mental, and cultural orders of nature, which appear to have arisen in that sequence, are recognized as equally real and mutually causal. The sciences, logic, phenomenology of experience, pragmatics of social action, and cultural semiotics can all contribute to our understanding of such a nature.