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Plato's Theory of Reincarnation: Eschatology and Natural Philosophy, DOUGLAS R. CAMPBELL

This article concerns the place of Plato's eschatology in his philosophy. The author argues that the theory of reincarnation appeals to Plato due to its power to explain how nonhuman animals came to be. Further, the outlines of this theory are entailed by other commitments, such as that embodiment disrupts psychic functioning, that virtue is always rewarded and vice punished, and that the soul is immortal. The author concludes by arguing that Plato develops a view of reincarnation as the chief tool that the gods have to ensure that virtue is victorious over vice throughout the whole cosmos.

Ciceronian *Officium* and Kantian Duty, ANDREE HAHMANN and MICHAEL VAZQUEZ

The authors examine the genealogy and transmission of moral duty in Western ethics. They begin with an uncontroversial account of the Stoic notion of the *kathēkon*, and then examine the pivotal moment of Cicero's translation of it into Latin as *officium*. They take a deflationary view of the impact of Cicero's translation and conclude that his translation does not mark a departure from the Stoic ideal. They find further confirmation of our deflationary position in the development of the notion of duty in Germany between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. They examine Pufendorf's critique of ancient eudaimonism and his appropriation of *officium*, and claim that it foreshadows Kant's rejection of Garve's Ciceronian ethics. They demonstrate the undeniable parallels between Kant's *Groundwork* and Garve's influential translation of Cicero's *De Officiis*, thereby indicating a novel way to understand Cicero's contribution to the development of modern moral philosophy.

A Maximalist Interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenological Observers, JAMES BANWELL

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is structured around two perspectives. While the work foregrounds the perspective of consciousness, Hegel also refers to the perspective of the "phenomenological observers," who witness the education of consciousness as it makes its way towards philosophical comprehension. Much recent commentary has attempted to downplay the sense in which the observers hold a privileged epistemic position relative to consciousness. In the first part of the article the author argues that this minimalist interpretation cannot be reconciled with Hegel's use of the observer perspective throughout the text. The remainder of the article defends a maximalist interpretation, by showing how the observer perspective corresponds to Hegel's own philosophical standpoint. The author argues that this conception of the role of the observers is compatible with the *Phenomenology's* stated role as an introduction to Hegel's philosophy, because the privileged epistemic position of the observers is justified by an internal critique of the standpoint of consciousness.

## Is Philosophical Hermeneutics Self-Refuting? CARLO DAVIA

One of the fundamental theses of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is that all knowledge is historically conditioned. This thesis appears to be self-refuting. That is, it appears to contradict itself insofar as its assertion that every knowledge claim is historically conditioned seems to assert an absolute, unconditionally true knowledge claim. If the historicity thesis does, in fact, refute itself in this way, then that spells trouble for philosophical hermeneutics. Gadamer was well aware of this, and so he attempts in several passages to respond to this charge of self-contradiction. Those passages, however, are brief and difficult to understand. They consequently have been either neglected or inadequately understood. This article makes better sense of those passages in order to defend Gadamer's historicity thesis as coherent.

## Ought Implies Can or Could Have, A. D. BASSFORD

The moral principle that Ought Implies Can (OIC) is often assumed without argument in normative discourse. Is this assumption defensible? Some would argue that it is not, as there are many purported counterexamples against it in the literature. However, OIC is not so much a single principle as rather a family of them. In this article the author argues that, while not every OIC-type principle is defensible, at least one of them may be. He defends the cognate moral principle that Ought Implies Can or Could Have (OICCH). He first shows that it is able to circumvent the traditional counterexamples to OIC. And then he shows that OICCH is even more plausible than some of the best alternative OIC-type principles to date. The upshot is that those who find OIC compelling should consider accepting OICCH instead.