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The Relational Ontology of Anaximander and Heraclitus, JAMES FILLER

The history of metaphysical thought has been dominated by the notion of substance as the ground of being, with substance, primarily following Aristotle, being understood in terms of independent/separate existence. This understanding raises fundamental problems, a primary one being the one–many problem. As Plato recognizes in both *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*, to assert being to be fundamentally either one or many leads to contradictions. However, there is an alternative understanding of the ground of being which can be traced to some of the earliest Presocratic thinkers. The author examines two of those philosophers, Anaximander and Heraclitus, and explores how they understand the ground of being primarily in terms of relation.

Kant's Inaugural Dissertation and the Problem of Rational Cosmology, STEPHEN HOWARD

Kant's 1770 Dissertation is surprisingly rarely read as a cosmological treatise about the "world." The few commentators who do so invariably claim that, in the fourth section of the work, Kant presents a purely intellectual cosmology, a relic of dogmatic, Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics. This article aims to show that attention to some often-overlooked passages yields a very different picture. Key to how Kant conceives of the form of the world is his distinction between the relations of co-ordination and subordination of substances. On the basis of this distinction, the author argues that the "principle of the form of the intelligible world" does not pertain to a transcendent intelligible world. Instead, the principle concerns an intellectual perspective on the world of substances co-ordinated in space and time. This interpretation has various consequences for our understanding of the development of Kant's critical philosophy.

The Transition to Self-consciousness in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, CAROLINE BOWMAN

This article provides a novel interpretation of the so-called transition to self-consciousness in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, where Hegel argues that the failure of the protagonist consciousness to formulate an understanding of the world in terms of forces and laws necessitates the shift to an investigation of its own self-conscious subjectivity. The author argues that we can make sense of the transition by attending to Hegel's account of the metaphysical structure of forces and laws, on the one hand, and the structure of self-consciousness, on the other. Following this approach, she argues that the transition represents the realization by the protagonist consciousness that the object of phenomenological inquiry must be metaphysically self-determining (or "infinite," in Hegel's terminology). The standpoint of self-consciousness accordingly emerges because the protagonist consciousness takes itself qua subject to exhibit the requisite self-determining structure. In addition to making sense of the transition to self-consciousness, this line of argumentation illuminates Hegel's subsequent focus on the activity of "desire."

Projections, Perceptual Constancy, and Geometry, YUVAL DOLEV

The notions "retinal images" and "retinal projection" are ubiquitous in both the scientific and philosophical literature on perception. However, this article argues that they belong to the former

and should be kept out of the latter. In the context of the empirical investigation of perception, projections play a crucial role, and help articulate pressing research problems. But, as part of the phenomenological and conceptual analysis of perception, projections give rise to untenable models and to avoidable conundrums, such as the much discussed issue of perceptual constancy. Why are projections and retinal images so prevalent in the philosophical literature? The author conjectures that the reason has to do with conceptual fallout of the effort to give a geometric representation to changes of perspective, a mission more daunting than it initially appears to be, and one that leads to the problematic insertion of projections into phenomenology. He suggests that correcting this shows perceptual constancy to be a starting point rather than a challenge for phenomenology.

Polger and Shapiro on Realization and Multiple Realization, KEN AIZAWA

Polger and Shapiro have two principal takes on realization: An individual being a member of a kind is an instance of realization, and a kind being a member of a kind is an instance of realization. Both of these conceptions of realization suffer from serious objections. The broader conclusion that emerges from these many flaws is that, while their versions of realization and multiple realization are implausible, this does nothing to undermine the viability of more recent versions of nonreductive physicalism based on property instances.