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Being as Communion: *Sophist* 247d–248b, COLIN C. SMITH

The author considers the Eleatic Stranger's account of being as communing (κοινωνεῖν), an under-recognized aspect of the well-known "dunamis proposal" and Plato's unfolding of the notion of being in the *Sophist*. The Stranger calls being "the power to act upon or be affected" (247d7-e3), and shortly thereafter describes "being affected or acting upon from a certain power" (248b6) as "communing" (248b2). This marks a shift away from understanding being as capacity toward understanding it as activity. The author identifies two functions of the "being-as-communion" account: (1) a critical response to the previous competing quantitative and qualitative ontologies, and (2) a new ontological notion that plays a key role in the great kinds discussion and what follows, capturing the sense in which to be is to engage actively in relations with structuring, causal kinds. He concludes by speaking to the account's valuable insight into the meaning of being as being-with and being-through.

The Instant between Time and Eternity: Plato's Revision of the Parmenidean Now in the *Parmenides*, HUAIYUAN ZHANG

Plato's view on time, a key aspect of his doctrine of forms, is influenced by his reception of Parmenides, but the way in which Plato takes up and modifies Parmenides' view is a matter of ongoing scholarly debate. In this article, the author analyzes Plato's revision of Parmenidean time by exploring four temporalities: the eternal present, timeless eternity, the enduring present, and the instant between time and eternity. Through this examination, she uncovers the common origin of both eternal present of Parmenides' fragment B8 and the flowing present of the phenomenal realm in the instant (ἐξάίφνης) in the *Parmenides*. This perspective on time offers a promising solution to Plato's problem of participation, bridging the gap between the eternal being of the form and the being in time of the particulars.

Transubstantiation as a Test Case for Desgabets's Cartesianism, FABIO MALFARA and THOMAS LENNON

Transubstantiation is a philosophical term used to describe what takes place in the rite of the Eucharist. The rite was proposed as a test case by Arnauld in his objections to Descartes's *Meditations*. The most credible, well-founded response came from Robert Desgabets, who in his account of transubstantiation appealed in one fashion or other to five principles variously found among other Cartesians as well as Descartes himself—principles of intentionality, clear and distinct perception, the status of sensible qualities, exemplification, and cognitive transcendence.

Naturalness and Deformation in Hegel's Inorganic Philosophy of Nature, OMAR QUIÑONEZ

This article discusses Hegel's claim that nature is the idea (*Idee*) having become external (*äußerlich*) to itself. Usually taken to signal a type of limitation in Hegel's philosophy, the author argues that recent interpretations of nature's externality are not entirely successful because they reconstruct nature by either looking back to logic or forward to spirit. Instead, the article offers

an interpretation that starts off from Hegel's argument that nature is "weak" (*ohnmächtig*) as it is not, nor can become, thoroughly rational. It then traces the implications of this view in Hegel's inorganic philosophy of mechanics and physics. There, in a discussion that culminates with matter as fundamentally "brittle," a picture of externality emerges as the likelihood in nature of "deformed" or "damaged" determinations. What is ultimately unique about nature vis-à-vis logic is a setting in which *partial* rational determination makes sense at all.

Deferred Ostension of Extinct and Fictive Kinds, CHAD ENGELLAND

This article applies Quine's account of deferred ostension and the Kripke-Putnam account of reference to natural kinds in order to solve two problems that arise concerning the deferred ostension of two sorts of absent referents, extinct and fictive kinds. First, the sample problem concerns how a rigid designation to a kind can be established even though the fossil or depiction is an imitative representation rather than an instance of the kind itself. The author argues that the retained characteristic shape, understood via analogy with living creatures, supports the deferred ostension of the extinct kind. Second, the contrast problem concerns how the deferred ostensions of imitative representations for extinct species differ from the imitative representations for fictional species, that is, how sampled fossils differ from sampled depictions. The author argues that the difference is a causal one. We know that fossils happen thanks to a natural causal process that embeds the fossil imitation in the primary world of perceived things; depictions of fictional kinds lack intrinsic causal properties and therefore embed their references in a secondary world of fiction. The article concludes by suggesting we approach the problem of negative existentials as a question of embedding in the primary world of causality or the secondary world of noncausal relations.