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Idol or Icon? Francisco Suárez and the Concept of Being, VICTOR SALAS

This essay addresses dominant critiques of Francisco Suárez's metaphysical project raised by many contemporary philosophers of religion. Those critiques often center upon two main claims. (1) God and creature are both comprehended under the concept of being such that God amounts to just one more being among others. As such, a univocal community of being results wherein God's divine transcendence and irreducibility to creation are destroyed. (2) Since Suárez employs a univocal concept of being when conducting his metaphysical speculations about God, he has (unwittingly) abandoned the God of Christian revelation in favor of a conceptual idol. The author argues that both critiques harbor a severe misunderstanding of Suárezian metaphysics, and that it is precisely in turning to the concept of being that Suárez defends both God's irreducible transcendence and his incomprehensibility. Paradoxically, to think of God in terms of being is just to leave God unthought.

Essence, Existence, and Being: An Inconsistency in Spinoza's Metaphysics? SANJA SÄRMAN

The author explores whether Spinoza can consistently maintain two doctrines which he espouses in his *Ethics*. The first doctrine is the equivalence between perfection, reality, being, and essence. The second doctrine is the Metaphysical Difference between that in which essence and existence are identical (God) and those things for which essence and existence are distinct (everything but God). The article is structured as follows. First, the author shows that these two key doctrines apparently clash. Second, she shows two ways in which this clash can be avoided. The first way consists in drawing a line between mere being and existence. This reading of Spinoza has sometimes been called "Platonist" in the secondary literature. The second way consists in denying that the Metaphysical Difference cuts reality at its joints. Instead, the Metaphysical Difference, on this reading, differentiates between appearances (those things in which essence and existence come apart) and reality (that thing in which they are one). This reading of Spinoza has sometimes been called Eleatic in the secondary literature. The author concludes by suggesting that, if the Spinozist rejects both the Eleatic and the Platonist approach, she is obliged to find another way to salvage her system.

Sensibility, Understanding, and Kant's Transcendental Deduction: From Epistemic Compositionism to Epistemic Hylomorphism, MAXIMILIAN TEGTMEYER

Can sensibility, as our capacity to be sensibly presented with objects, be understood independently of the understanding, as the capacity to form judgments about those objects? It is a truism that for judgments to be empirical knowledge they must agree with what sensibility presents. Moreover, it is a familiar thought that objectivity involves absolute independence from intellectual acts. The author argues that together these thoughts motivate a common reading of Kant on which operations of sensibility are conceived as intelligible independently of acts of the understanding, so that their supposed objectivity can validate judgments as empirical knowledge. He contends that there are two reasons why this epistemic compositionism is implausible both

as a reading of Kant and in itself. First, read compositionally, Kant's Transcendental Deduction is unable to fulfill its stated aim of showing that the categories are objectively valid, that is, exemplified by the objects that sensibility presents. Second, Kant sees that sensibility by itself cannot be understood to even purport to present objects, thus undermining the very intelligibility of compositionality. The author argues that, given these challenges, Kant's Deduction develops an alternative account, on which operations of sensibility and acts of the understanding can be understood only together. He contends that this epistemic hylomorphism transforms the familiar thought underlying compositionality: objectivity simultaneously involves formal agreement with intellectual acts in general and material independence from any specific such act. He thus shows how Kant reconceives our conception of objectivity by overcoming compositionality in favor of hylomorphism.

“The Fact of Reason”: The Axiomatic Model in Kant's Moral Philosophy, KRISTOFFER WILLERT

In the epicenter of his attempt to justify the “objective validity” of morality and freedom in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant introduces a so-called fact of reason, which is rendered as the fact that human beings are *conscious* of the moral ought's categorical authority. However, few parts of Kant's thinking have bemused commentators as much as this. In this article, the author explores a set of intersecting problems related to the fact of reason: (1) the problem of its general argumentative role in Kant's practical philosophy, (2) the problem of the fact as a *brute fact*. He argues that both problems can be understood and resolved only if we regard Kant's introduction of the fact of reason as an implicit attempt to articulate intrinsic problems with reductive explanations of morality. His main claim, which has been surprisingly absent in most interpretations of Kant's fact of reason, will be that the fact of reason functions as an undeniable yet improvable fact (similar to mathematical principles) from which other practical truths (such as the objective reality of freedom) can be derived. As Kant says unambiguously in the *Jäsche-Logic*: the “reality” of the *moral law* “is an axiom.”

Understanding the World Holistically: Heidegger's Practical Philosophy and the Rethinking of Transcendentality, NIALL KEANE

For Heidegger, world is constitutively bound up with human being's way of being. Yet after *Being and Time* he criticizes an excessively one-sided pragmatic reading of his concept of world, insisting that world is more than a referential totality of use involvements, tools, or existential projections. This article examines how Heidegger's phenomenological analysis should be understood to promote both a practical orientation as well as a more transcendental dimension. The centrality of praxis in Heidegger's work will not be contested. What will be explored is whether what Heidegger calls “worldliness” or the “phenomenon of world” can be reduced to contexts of use relations or social practices and projects. The argument is made that world, for Heidegger, should be understood as an open space of meaning emergence through which diverse activities, some of which are practical, first become accessible to the human being. The claim will be advanced that world is more than the human being's disclosive understanding and that an overly pragmatic interpretation circumvents the surpassive dimension of world.