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Desire, Reason, and Intellect in *Nicomachean Ethics* 6, PATRICK CORRY

This article proposes a *via media* between intellectualism and nonrationalism on the question of how, according to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, a virtuous person determines the goal (*telos*) for action (*praxis*). The author argues that, according to Aristotle, the goal is set neither by discursive reasoning nor by well-formed nonrational desires but, rather, by practical intellect (*nous*), which is a capacity for nondiscursive perception (*aisthēsis*) of a singular action as choiceworthy in itself. He argues that for Aristotle the activity of *nous* completes and perfects the operation of prudence (*phronēsis*) or excellent practical thinking, and that this operation essentially includes a distinctively intellectual desire, which is required both for the correct perception of final actions and for the movement of the deliberating agent to act.

Causal Power and Perfection: Descartes's Second A Posteriori Argument for the Existence of God, SAMUEL MURRAY

The third Meditation is typically understood to contain two a posteriori arguments for the existence of God. The author focuses on the second argument, where Descartes proves the existence of God partly in virtue of proving that Descartes cannot be the cause of himself. To establish this, Descartes argues that if he were the cause of himself, then he would endow himself with any conceivable perfection. The justification for this claim is that bringing about a substance is more difficult than creating an attribute, so anything that can do the former can do the latter. While current explanations of this justification are either implausible or inadequate, the author argues that this principle derives support from a scholastic distinction between being-as-such and determinate being. With this distinction in view, we can make sense of Descartes's argument without appealing to ambiguous or inadequate notions.

Inertia, Science, and Substantial Forms in Leibniz's Early Metaphysics, SHOHEI EDAMURA

Leibniz considered that there are substances in a body, each of which does not solely have a shape and size and can act spontaneously. Although he started to regard bodies as having inherent substantial forces in 1678–79, what exactly led him to suppose this is not obvious. The author aims to articulate Leibniz's most important motivation for "restoring" substantial forms. He first notes that Leibniz considered that every body tends to slow down because of its natural inertia. He then discusses that Leibniz had two arguments to postulate the existence of substantial forms, the first of which is based on his view that God providentially manages the universe in the most efficient way. The second and more interesting argument is based on Leibniz's understanding of science, according to which a scientific explanation of motion should be given in terms of the nature of the body.

Fichte and Hegel on Advancing from the Beginning, YADY OREN

In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel criticizes Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* for advancing from the beginning through external reflection and thus failing to understand both the nature of the beginning and the proper method to advance from it. This article shows that Fichte's advance from the beginning preempts Hegel's critique and shares Hegel's premises with respect to the method of advancing. The author first analyzes Hegel's critique of Fichte in the *Science of Logic*, which he follows by showing that Fichte levels a similar critique against Schelling's conception of the beginning set out in his system of 1801. Turning to the *Wissenschaftslehre* of 1794/5, the author then demonstrates that Fichte's method of advancing from the beginning addresses every point of Hegel's critique. He concludes by identifying the similarity and difference between Fichte's and Hegel's methods of advancing.

Spectral Productances and Color Primitivism, CALLIE McGRATH