The Soul as Intermediary in Plato's *Timaeus*, JAMES WOOD

Contrary to common belief, the *Timaeus* does not support a dualistic metaphysics. Careful examination of each facet of Timaeus's cosmology shows that the activity of cosmic ordering depends on the ongoing interaction of various metaphysical factors, with the soul as the central integrating agent of demiurgic generation and formation. Soul is both the expression of demiurgic causality in the cosmos and the representation of the form of living being that gives life to the cosmic body. Soul bridges the gap between metaphysical opposites and so allows for the indivisible forms to exist and be at work within divisible bodies, informing those bodies with determinate qualities. At the same time, generative intellect acts through proportionately ordered soul to bring proportionate order to the elemental bodies through geometrical shapes (triangles) and in turn to the bodies composed of those shapes. In sum, rational soul generates beings by bringing together immaterial qualities and geometrical concepts in space.

The Personal Soul Presupposes the Memory: On Augustinian *Memoria*, VICTORIA TRUMBULL

St. Augustine's philosophy of memory is famously complex: Augustine moves between a psychological description of remembering in the Confessions to a deeply metaphysical and theoretical account of spiritual memoria in De Trinitate. The author argues that memory, for Augustine, serves as the foundation of the personal self, mind, or soul. In the first part of the article, she explores how memory serves as the psychological foundation of personality, insofar as it provides the narrative basis for human experience in time. In the second part, she argues that memory also serves as the metaphysical foundation of personality, insofar as it indicates the unconscious persistence of the mind to itself, serving as the means of our knowing or rediscovering ourselves as spiritual beings created in the image of God. In total, this article provides a detailed account of Augustine's philosophy of memory and demonstrates the essential role of memory in his theological anthropology.

St. Bonaventure on the Intellect: Sources and Teaching, CARL A. VATER

Finding Aristotle: An Unspoken Debt in Kant's Teleology, JUAN CARLOS GONZÁLEZ

In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*—Kant's seminal work on teleology—Kant never once mentions the philosopher who is widely credited with inventing teleology, namely, Aristotle. To make matters worse, when Kant does survey and critique available views on natural teleology throughout the history of philosophy, he seems to completely overlook Aristotle's teleology. While this may lead us to surmise that Kant was either indifferent towards or ignorant of Aristotle's teleology, the author argues that it is possible to read Kant as advancing a version of Aristotle's natural teleology—a version, of course, that respects the limits drawn by Kant's transcendental philosophy. Moreover, our investigation into Kant's Aristotelianism reveals a new way of explaining the organism without rendering it a convenient fiction or dogmatically

asserting its reality. In the end, our exercise of situating Aristotle in Kant's account of natural teleology reveals that omission is sometimes a high form of intellectual flattery.

Of Being Otherwise: Schelling's System of Freedom, ATTAY KREMER

Schelling's *Freiheitsschrift* takes on the problem of the freedom of the will within pantheism, aiming to conceptualize both the notion of a system of philosophy, and that of freedom, in such a way that they are commensurate with each other as well as with human life. He seeks a "living notion" of the system of freedom. This paper explores Schelling's understanding of the notions of freedom and systematicity, contextualizing the system of freedom with his oeuvre. Building on Hogrebe's interpretation of the *Weltalter*, the notions of system and freedom are explicated by reading the logical aspects of Schelling's ontology, specifically his understanding of the copula. To complement the literature that understands the text as an ontology of evil (e.g., Stern and Brown), this paper analyses the notion of system of freedom, in the context of which that ontology is formulated. The notion of evil, it will be argued, is an expression of freedom as part of a living system of philosophy.