

VOLUME LXXIX, Number 3

March 2026

Avicenna's Aristotelian Account of Chance, WEITING HUANG

Interpreters have long been puzzled about how Avicenna's account of chance is compatible with his causal determinism. In this article, the author first shows that the main strategies for showing their compatibility—those offered by Wisnovsky and Belo—are inconsistent with the textual evidence for Avicenna's Aristotelian account of chance. He then argues that Avicenna's Aristotelian account of chance, which claims that chance events are not always or for the most part ('the infrequency claim') and that chance events have a *per accidens* efficient cause ('the accidentality claim'), is compatible with causal determinism. Finally, he considers the relation of the two Aristotelian claims about chance in Avicenna, and argues that for Avicenna, something comes to be by chance, if and only if it has no *per se* efficient cause and is not a result of material necessity.

Necessity, Certainty, and Innateness in Avicenna's Rationalism, ISMAIL KURUN

This article intervenes in a vigorous debate in the study of medieval Islamic philosophy over whether Avicenna's epistemology is rationalist or empiricist. To settle the debate, scholars have so far focused almost entirely on Avicenna's emanationism or abstractionism. In this study, the author articulates two core theses of rationalism: first, innatism, the view that the mind starts out with certain basic truths or concepts; and second, necessitarianism, the view that we can attain necessary or absolutely certain and substantive knowledge. The former has been insufficiently discussed in the debate while the latter has been entirely overlooked. The author demonstrates that Avicenna is not committed to innatism but does subscribe in his natural philosophy to necessitarianism. Thus, he concludes that Avicenna is a rationalist by virtue of the necessitarianism of his natural philosophy. This finding sheds new light on how we should understand Avicenna's philosophical project.

The Problem of Method and Self-Knowledge in Kant's Transcendental Philosophy, EDWARD KWOK

Philosophy is a discipline that knows its own knowing, and Kant's Critique is precisely such an attempt of self-knowledge. However, is such self-knowledge possible within the domains of Kant's own philosophy? In this article, the author problematizes the possibility of this philosophical self-knowledge that methodologically grounds Kant's critical inquiry into the conditions of possibility of objective knowledge, and shows that there is no theoretical resource within Kant's philosophy that sufficiently justifies this methodological self-knowledge. The aim is to elucidate a productive tension between the content of Kant's critical philosophy and its method. By thinking through and taking seriously the methodological problem of self-knowledge, this article shows that Kant's Critique not only presents us with a difficulty that deepens our understanding of the nature of self-knowledge, but it is also a point of departure that fruitfully motivates the further developments of Kant's own thinking and subsequent German philosophies.

Asceticism and Negative Virtue Epistemology: Nietzsche and Adorno, TODD HEDRICK

This article examines an apparent affinity between Nietzsche's and Adorno's epistemological ideas. It explores how and why both authors conceive of cognitive success and failure in normatively charged terms, as having a just or vibrant experience of the object, aspirations that they articulate in terms of a cognitive ethos and not formal definitions of truth or knowledge. Both authors also view success as elusive and failure the norm, at least under modern socio-cultural conditions; they provide similar explanations for these positions, which combine socio-historical analyses and diagnoses of psychological pathology. However, it argues that, from Nietzsche's perspective, Adorno's method of negation, and cognitive ideal of noncoercive synthesis, amounts to another philosophical defense of "the ascetic ideal," which his own "perspectivism" is pitched as a "life affirming" alternative to.

Nishida, Husserl, and the Problem of the Continuity of Objects, DAVID ZOLLER

Nishida's pursuit of an ontology oriented to the predicate rather than the grammatical subject is a promising and challenging idea, as it overturns many conventional intuitions about objects. Both Nishida himself and his commentators note that his views suggest a new approach to the classic puzzle of continuity: that is, the puzzle as to how an object constitutes a unity as it changes properties or offers different profiles to the observer. The basis of continuity can no longer be a grammatical subject that owns its properties; the basis must instead be the predicative "place" (basho) in which the individual is situated. While interesting on its own, the notion has been criticized as being abstract and difficult to square with the phenomenology of actual experience. Here the author compares Nishida's explicit dealings with the continuity puzzle in the 1920s and early 1930s with Husserl's. As he shows, both Nishida and Husserl tend to reject what he terms "opaque" and "regressive" solutions to the puzzle and share a surprising number of intuitions. While Nishida's solution to the puzzle ultimately differs from Husserl's, the surprising commonalities paint a Nishidan picture of the phenomenal object that, while unusual, is phenomenologically sensitive, plausible, and suited to dialogue.